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1. Introductory and ‘contextual’ comments  
 
1.1. There are a number of concerns about the minister’s foreword, and the subsequent 
introduction to the document, as they contain significant omissions, implicit 
assumptions and questionable interpretations that, individually and collectively, will 
influence the interpretation of the document by the consultation’s target audience.  
This in turn, will adversely influence the responses from key stakeholders, 
interested parties and the public to both the document’s content and the broader 
reform agenda for the emergency services, which the consultation forms part of.  
 
1.2. The second sentence of the minister’s foreword refers to the long-term, significant 
decrease in the number of fire incidents attended by FRS. This (yet again) gives the 
false impression that the work of the Fire and Rescue Services is falling and 
continues to fall in the long term. It fails to acknowledge evidence submitted to the 
Grenfell Inquiry from the Fire Sector Federation and elsewhere, that while the 
numbers of fire incidents are reducing, the losses from them are up over fourfold 
per incident, reflecting increasing complexity in modern construction and 
occupation. In addition, although paragraph 3 notes that the past decade has also 
seen an ever growing number of non-fire incidents, it fails to make the point that 
the latter now significantly outnumber the former and are increasing faster than the 
former are decreasing. 
 
1.3. Paragraph 1 suggests that this ‘must be a testament to the successful fire protection 
and prevention that FRS deliver’ which could give the impression that such 
prevention and protection work is increasing. In fact, there is widespread and 
increasing evidence, that while financial support for public services is being 
universally reduced, there has been a disproportionate reduction in preventative 
services, most notably in the NHS, but increasingly evident across all public services 
as reductions in higher profile reactive or frontline services generates greater 
adverse publicity. 
 
1.4. There is no mention in the foreword or the introduction of the recent reports from 
the National Audit Office1 or the Public Accounts Committee2, that inter alia refer to 
inadequacies in the sponsorship, leadership, financial control and infrastructural 
support for the service from central government. These have significantly 
influenced both the context of the consultation exercise and the content of the 
consultation document  
 
1.5. There is, for example, no explicit mention of the long-term reductions, and more 
importantly, planned future reductions, in financial support from central 
government, which will adversely affect the service, the delivery of the national 
frameworks ambitions and the safety of the public.  
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1.6. The new Minister refers to evidence from Grenfell and Dame Judith’s interim 
report3 saying we need a new intelligent system of regulation and enforcement, 
which encourages everyone to do the right thing and holds those that cut corners to 
account. We welcome the commitment to the government working with Dame 
Judith and other partners to identifying changes that need to be made to the 
system during the next phase of the review and that the learning and 
recommendations from Dame Judith’s review and the Grenfell Inquiry are captured 
and reflected in the new framework and the wider strategic and operational regime 
for Fire and Rescue services. 
 
1.7. In our view, successive governments have been significantly reducing investment in 
the fire safety of the public and have been reducing the scope and weakening the 
regulatory and enforcement powers of public authorities. These have clearly 
contributed to the circumstances that led to the Grenfell tragedy. We are 
disappointed that the new framework adopts and assumes the continuation of this 
long term financial context, while not being explicit about this position.  
 
1.8. We would have preferred to see a clear commitment to comprehensive 
improvement of the strategic and operational regime for all emergency services and 
a clear commitment to improving the fire safety to the public. If these ambitions are 
to be realistically addressed then the statement that ‘the proposals are unlikely to 
lead to additional costs or savings for businesses, charities or the voluntary sector or 
on the public sector’, should be removed as such a statement is clearly misleading, 
contradictory and untenable in the current and foreseeable circumstances.  
 
2. Delivery of Core Functions 
 
a) Identify and assess (paragraphs 2.1 – 2.2) 
 
2.1. The new framework is commendably clear that the overarching statutory 
responsibility of every fire and rescue authority is to ‘assess all foreseeable fire and 
rescue related risks that affect their communities, whether they are local, cross-
border, multi-authority and/or national in nature from fires to terrorist attacks’ and 
that ‘Fire and rescue authorities must put in place arrangements to prevent and 
mitigate these risks, either through adjusting existing provision, effective 
collaboration and partnership working or building new capacity’.  
 
2.2. This clearly embraces FRS contributions to wider issues such as public health and 
social outcomes such as health and wellbeing and their statutory obligations to the 
public in Fire and Rescue legislation, financial legislation and broader public service 
legislation such as Health and Safety legislation or the Public Services (Social Value) 
Act 2012. Although we comment below on the proposals for Inspection, 
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Accountability and Assurance contained in Section 3 of the new national framework, 
we would also wish to note the inconsistency between the scope of this 
conceptualisation of the core functions, as opposed to the much narrower scope 
suggested for the Inspection programme and framework 2018/19 as outlined in the 
HMICFRS consultation document. It would appear that HMICFRS are not proposing 
to inspect the full range of FRS responsibilities, which will in our view, compromise 
the ‘crucial assurance function’ the inspectorate is to provide (referred to in 
paragraph 3.2) nor will it provide a fair and comprehensive view of the services 
performance. 
 
 
b) Prevent and protect (paragraphs 2.3 – 2.8) 
 
2.3. We agree and commend the statement that ‘prevention is (always?) better than 
cure’ but are disappointed that there is no commitment nor proposals in the 
framework to reverse the disproportionate decrease in preventative action and 
strategies referred to above that has been experienced in recent years. 
 
2.4. As the Fire Sector Federation and National Fire Chiefs Council evidence to the 
Grenfell Inquiry and Dame Judith’s interim report on the review of the Building 
Regulation demonstrates, the number of fire inspection and fire investigations 
carried out by FRS personnel has been consistently falling and their scope 
consistently narrowing. This limits the ability of FRS to put in place an appropriate 
risk-based inspection program as required by paragraph 2.3. 
 
2.5. We strongly support the expectations and contents of paragraphs 2.4 to 2.6 
regarding multi-agency collaboration; targeting those at greatest risk and the 
sharing of information. However, the comment that this should not be at the 
expense of core fire functions should be deleted or replaced. This is likely to skew 
the objective assessment of risks and the evaluation of alternative options.  
 
2.6. We agree with paragraph 2.7 but note that safeguarding arrangements have their 
own scrutiny and inspection arrangements. Statutory safeguarding arrangements 
are primarily part of the preventative strategies as opposed to response strategies. 
Provision for incorporating the results of such scrutiny is not clearly included in the 
HMICFRS proposals for FRS service inspections, which refers on page 8 to “fire 
safety, firefighting, road traffic accidents and other emergencies”.  
 
2.7. We are concerned about potential interpretations of paragraph 2.8  which states 
that FRA should only pursue prevention and protection activities ‘which can be 
demonstrated to impact effectively and cost-efficiently on risk reduction within 
their communities’. We suspect or consider this to be an unnecessarily restrictive 
and inefficient over reaction to some ad hoc incidents of unjustified expenditure in 
the past.  
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2.8. There are three issues with this position, one relating to ‘evidence’, one relating to 
the form of evaluation and one relating to consistency within the document.  
Although there are no proposals in the framework to improve the data and 
evidence available to FRS, the NAO and PAC reports make it clear that the evidence 
base, particularly for evaluating protective or preventative services needs 
improving.  
 
2.9. The likely results of this proposal is clearly inconsistent with the minister’s earlier 
statement that ‘prevention is always better than cure’. Finally, there is no 
appreciation of efficiency or effectiveness as opposed to cost. The current proposal 
also appears to reflect a lack appreciation that short, medium and long-term 
evaluations may yield differing results and that there are a variety of evaluation 
techniques available. In our view the most appropriate evaluative technique 
available should be used for the activity being evaluated (See also comments on 
Value for Money proposals below).  
 
We strongly support the second half of paragraph 2.8.   
 
c) Respond (paragraphs 2.9 – 2.11) 
 
2.10. Paragraph 2.11 states that FRA business continuity arrangements must be able to 
meet the full range of service delivery and national resilience duties and 
commitments and should not be on the basis of armed forces assistance being 
available. With the increased responsibilities highlighted in the framework, planned 
reductions in central resources, and more restrictions on assumed resources, this 
means demand and challenges will go up, while resources become increasingly 
restricted. We believe this combination of circumstances will increase risk to the 
public.   
 
d) Integrated Risk Management Plan (paragraph 2.12). 
 
2.11. In the second bullet point the term ‘in a cost effective way’ should be replaced by 
‘taking account of economy, efficiency and effectiveness’. 
 
2.12. In the fifth bullet point, the three-year time span stipulated is inconsistent with the 
2 year timespan used for reserves in paragraph 5.7. IRMPs should align with 
financial plans and we believe 3 years should be adopted or both.    
 
2.13. In general terms we would like to have seen a commitment and proposals to 
improve the risk assessments in the IRMP process, to embrace both the risks to 
individuals and communities and the risks to buildings premises and operations.  
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3. Inspection, Accountability and Assurance 
 
a) Inspection (paragraphs 3.1 – 3.5)  
 
3.1. Paragraph 3.2 states that HMICFRS will provide a crucial assurance function and 
provides a definition of responsibilities. However, the HMICFRS consultation 
document is not consistent with the proposed framework and appears to address a 
narrower range of responsibilities. 
 
3.2. According to their document, HMICFRS are going to provide service inspections of 
directly provided fire and rescue services. They are not going to routinely or 
regularly provide inspections of the governing bodies, whether fire and rescue 
authorities or Police and Fire Commissioners.  
 
3.3. The latter are the bodies that are ultimately responsible for assessing the risks; 
determining strategic priorities; establishing the budget and ultimately holding 
statutory responsibility for the safety of the public but HMICFRS suggest they are 
not going to be routinely inspected with the results regularly and expeditiously 
reported to the public.  
 
3.4. If, during an inspection of services, HMICFRS find evidence that they ‘inhibit’ the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Chief Fire Officer they ‘may’ carry out a separate 
corporate governance inspection.  
 
3.5. There is considerable historical evidence available from tackling failing public 
services and authorities; from peer reviews; from improvement regimes; from 
performance assessments; from government interventions and from sector-led 
improvements. This consistently shows that to be efficient and effective, and 
provide the solid foundations for sustained recovery or improvement, the 
regulators or the government need to assess and address, the adequacy of the 
leadership and governance arrangements; the adequacy of the operational delivery 
and advice from professional officers; and the collaborative partnership 
arrangements as well as the relationship between the three.  
 
3.6. To inspect them partially and/or separately or not at all, cannot optimise the 
efficiency or effectiveness of the Inspectorate, the inspection process or the 
assurance to government or to the public. It is somewhat ironic that the current 
(and previous) Intervention Protocols are addressed to Fire and Rescue Authorities 
(Annex A refers exclusively and repeatedly to Authorities) when these are not 
routinely to be inspected under this framework.   
 
3.7. The current proposals from HMICFRS make no mention of cross-border, multi-
authority and/or national issues mentioned by the framework. They merely advise 
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that they intend to commence inspections of the 45 fire and rescue services in 
summer 2018 on the principal functions of a fire and rescue authority, i.e. fire 
safety, firefighting, road traffic accidents and other emergencies.  
 
3.8. There is no clarity or assurance on the inspection of services or parts of services that 
have been outsourced to private or third sector providers; jointly provided with 
other FRS or blue-light services, or other organisations whether public, private or 
third sector. There is no mention of statutory collaborative arrangements such as 
the Crime and Disorder arrangements, safeguarding or resilience responsibilities.  
 
3.9. HMICFRS accepts that the Home Office can commission thematic or cross-cutting 
inspections but clearly states that ‘HMICFRS is not funded to carry out thematic 
Inspections’.  
 
3.10. There is no commitment to making additional resources available for thematic 
inspections from the Home Office document, and the clear impression from 
HMICFRS is that to carry them out in the absence of such funding would 
compromise their fiduciary duty. 
 
3.11. In our view, the two documents are inconsistent and their proposals, if 
implemented, will not provide the level of public assurance that the public and key 
stakeholders have the right  to expect. 
 
3.12. In terms of the inspection framework, we maintain that the inspection and 
accountability arrangements should form part of the scrutiny arrangements with 
direct reporting to parliament and the public rather than the government (through 
the Secretary of State). We acknowledge that the Secretary of State now has 
powers to initiate inspections, require data and information to be provided and to 
receive an annual report from the Chief Fire and Rescue Inspector.  
 
3.13. We would have preferred to have these powers vested in the Chief Inspector so as 
to increase independence and provide greater reassurance to the public. However, 
while accepting current arrangements we would wish to see further safeguards 
identified and implemented for increased reassurance as to the independence of 
the inspectorate and its reports. This could include additional requirements for 
timely publication of reports or expected referrals to the Home Affairs Select 
Committee.  
 
 
b) Intervention (paragraphs 3.6 – 3.9) 
 
3.14. As stated in our introduction, we have been conducting a separate research project 
on Intervention and/or engagement by central government in FRS/FRA since the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister formed a Fire and Rescue Improvement 
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Support Team in 2005. This was originally intended as a means for the government 
to engage with those FRAs assessed as ‘poor’ or ‘week’ in the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment Reports that were due to be published by August 2005.   
 
3.15. We have provided our response to Annex A, ‘Protocol on Central Government 
Intervention Action for Fire and Rescue Authorities’ in the appropriate section later 
in this questionnaire. 
 
c) Accountability, assurance, scrutiny and transparency (paragraphs 3.10 – 3.18) 
 
3.16. The objectives included in this section are laudable. Although the concepts of 
accountability assurance, scrutiny and transparency are all different, they clearly 
overlap and are generally complementary in this purpose.  It is the combination of 
their deployment in an efficient and effective regime that collectively provides the 
necessary public assurance. As currently proposed, in our view, there are some 
inadequacies or ‘gaps’ in the proposed arrangements as follows: 
 
 There is no mention of inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
scrutiny functions or the PFCPs (here or in the governance section or in 
HMICFRS consultation).  
 There is no obligation to have any fire and rescue expertise on the Police Fire 
and Crime Panel (either here or in the governance section). 
 There is no acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the current form, scope 
and content of the Statement of Assurance (paragraph 3.14) despite both 
the Home Office and the Joint Emergency Services Research Team carrying 
out reviews in 2016.  
 There is no acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the current evidence 
base nor any commitment or express intention to improve it. Paragraph 3.18 
only refers to local and national data being made available not extended, 
improved or quality assured.  
  
4. Governance 
 
4.1. We have outlined in the previous two sections, our view of the need for improved 
governance arrangements in terms of better scrutiny and improved accountability 
and transparency arrangements with improved assurance through a more 
sophisticated and comprehensive inspection regime.   
 
4.2. There appears in paragraphs 4.7 and 4.8 to be an anomaly in terms of the Chief Fire 
Officer i.e. if ‘the FRA should give due regard to the professional advice of the CFO 
when making decisions affecting the operation of the FRS’ (paragraph 4.7) why is 
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this not applicable to the Police Fire and Crime Commissioner (4.8)?  It surely should 
be. 
 
5. Achieving Value for Money 
 
5.1. There is no explicit acknowledgement in the framework (or in the HMICFRS 
consultation) of the long term reductions in central government financial support, 
or the planned future reductions of central government grant or the continuing cap 
on generating local revenue through taxation. This reflects the Spending Review 
2015 and subsequent central government financial settlements and is clearly a key 
part of the context of the Value for Money objectives. 
  
5.2. There is however the clear assertion that fire and rescue authorities “must manage 
their budgets ensuring efficient and effective use of resources while pursuing all 
feasible opportunities to keep costs down”. 
 
5.3. There are however inter alia, three particular generic issues or concerns that we 
have about the documents approach to assessing and achieving Value for Money. 
 
5.4. Neither the Home Office document nor the new inspectorates document, appear to 
recognise that Value for Money will vary and can be significantly different 
depending on whether you measure it in the short, medium or long term or that 
different timescales may be more or less appropriate to different services, activities, 
tasks or projects.  
 
5.5. There are numerous tools and techniques available for measuring value for money, 
according to the objectives, inputs, outputs and outcomes of these services, 
activities, tasks or projects. Both documents appear predominantly to focus FRS 
attention onto short-term impacts or implications (paragraph 5.3 being an 
honourable exception – which we welcome). Secondly, the framework, appears to 
be predominantly concerned with costs. 
 
5.6. When asked by public service providers to assess value for money, most 
professionals would want to identify the most appropriate timescale and the most 
appropriate techniques to use in the prevailing circumstances, so as to facilitate 
optimal decisions. For example, in terms of evaluation, they might suggest one of 
the following basic evaluations: 
 
 Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
 Financial Return on Investment Assessment, 
 Multi-Agency Return on Investments Assessment, 
 Social Return on Investment Assessments. 
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5.7. Neither document appears to have thought through or even acknowledge these 
issues when articulating their proposals for assessing Value for Money. 
 
5.8. Similarly, the definition of Value for Money referred to within the two documents is 
often inconsistent within and between the documents.  
 
5.9. The most commonly used definition of Value for Money since the establishment of 
the Audit Commission in 1983, relates to the three e’s of measuring value for money 
by reference to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. These clearly related but also 
clearly different from each other.  
 
5.10. Not only are these three concepts used inconsistently and partially throughout the 
framework, but there is no acknowledgement that this means of definition fails to 
fully acknowledge and enshrine a true reflection of public and collective costs and 
benefits alongside and supplementing individual costs and benefits. 
 
5.11. Public or collective costs and benefits are particularly important in risk based, rather 
than demand led services and the three e’s are not always the most appropriate 
concepts or techniques for measuring prevention and protection services. 
 
5.12. This part of the framework should also acknowledge FRS’s obligations under the 
Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012. 
 
a) Reserves (paragraphs 5.5 – 5.9)  
 
5.13. As mentioned in section 3 above, the reserves strategy should be aligned with the 
IRMP timescale (one is proposed as 3 year one as 2 years). Neither of these 
suggestions align with the practice of a 4 year indicative financial settlements from 
central government. 
 
5.14. Paragraph 5.9 is generally supported – with the exception of the final proposed 
requirement – we believe this is over detailed and over prescriptive. The previous 
three requirements in our view should be sufficient. 
 
b) Collaborations (paragraphs 5.13 – 5.19)  
 
5.15. There are very helpful and useful clarifications particularly in paragraphs 5.14 to 
5.19 which should be retained. 
 
c) Trading (paragraphs 5.22 – 5.24) 
 
5.16. We particularly welcome the more prudent approach encouraged by these 
proposals than those that were encouraged in previous government policy such as  
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localism. There is a relatively limited amount of scope for commercial trading in Fire 
and Rescue Services and some services in the past have devoted a disproportionate 
amount of time and resources to attempting to generate trading/commercial 
activity.   
 
6. Workforce 
 
6.1. Chapter 6 is primarily a series of reiterations of previous information. Each FRA (no 
mention of PFCC), should have a people strategy (paragraph 6.1) designed in 
‘collaboration’ (not consultation) with the workforce, and taking account of the 
NFCC’s people strategy. In our view, both FRA and PFCC should have strategies and 
‘consultation’ is the appropriate process. 
 
6.2. All FRAs must implement the standards approved by the Professional Standards 
body, although we note the draft framework in footnote 2 advises that this part of 
the policy is under development with an announcement likely to be made before 
the final framework is published. 
 
6.3. There is undue prominence in both the executive summary and in chapter 6, to the 
‘re-engagement of senior officers post retirement’. Any re-engagement of former 
senior officers will only be made in exceptional circumstances and will be subject of 
a public vote, although the views of scrutiny body whether for FRA or PFCC should 
in our view be sought and published.  
 
6.4. The draft national framework includes the wording issued after the earlier specific 
consultation and advises there will be no more changes following this consultation 
process. References to the issue should now be dropped in the final framework. 
 
 
 
7. National Resilience 
 
7.1. Despite an earlier assertion to the contrary, section 7 of the draft framework does 
impose new responsibilities on local fire and rescue authorities and fire and rescue 
services. 
  
7.2. Developing Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack capability is an example and while 
the document states the government has ‘committed’ significant resources, it does 
not say that these are additional resources. In fact, the government’s commitment 
will come from the existing resource envelope.  
 
12 
 
7.3. More locally, paragraph 7.14 states that where they have MTFA capability, FRA 
must also ‘put in place’ ‘arrangements to ensure their teams are fully available at all 
times including periods when ‘business continuity arrangements are in place’. One 
such period may include a period of industrial action. This plus the requirement not 
to assume the military is available, effectively reduces the resources available, and 
means that overall these proposals will result in increased demand at the same time 
as more restricted resources are available to meet demands. 
 
a) Gap analysis (paragraphs 7.6 – 7.9) 
 
7.4. It is noticeable that these paragraphs give a government commitment to help 
identify any gaps but no commitment to reduce or eliminate any gaps – it is closing 
the gaps that is more important. A commitment to adequately resource and 
expedite the closure of any gaps is what the public has the right to expect. 
 
b) National Resilience Assurance (paragraphs 7.16 – 7.17) 
 
7.5. Paragraph 7.16 specifically refers to assurance to the government – this should be 
extended to be an obligation to provide assurance to the public (preferably through 
the select committee procedures of parliament) as well as the government. 
 
8. Timescales and Scope 
 
8.1. Part 8 of the document adds to the impression that the document has been 
prepared and published in haste. It advises that the framework will have an open-
ended duration, as was the case with the 2012 Framework. All three earlier 
frameworks ran for time-limited periods, which resulted in timely reviews and 
improvements. These earlier frameworks were more successful at improving the 
service and the safety of the public5. This clearly also helped key stakeholders, 
parliament and the public to call the government to account.  
 
8.2. We welcome proposals for a ‘biennial report to parliament’ on the extent to which 
FRAs are acting in accordance with the framework, although this should be 
extended to PFCC, Mayors and London. However, there is no evaluation proposed 
as to whether the framework remains ‘fit for purpose’ or whether the government 
itself has been discharging its responsibilities adequately. 
 
8.3. Noting the experience of the recent NAO report1 this proposal has clear resonances. 
That investigation started off with a clear focus on the adequacy of the 45 Fire and 
Rescue Services performance, before finding that inadequate sponsorship, 
leadership, financial control and infrastructural support for the service from DCLG 
that was the real issue. At that time Fire and Rescue Authorities and Services were 
not being provided with the tools and techniques, let alone the leadership and 
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support, that would allow them to do the job – the scope of this proposal should be 
expanded to cover all responsibilities, not just the local services. 
 
Annex A: Intervention Protocol  
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. There are three fundamental aspects of the proposed approach to intervention by 
central government into failing or significantly underperforming public services or 
organisations that have been a feature of the intervention regimes operated in Local 
Government and in the Fire Sector since government intervention and engagement 
was introduced for Comprehensive Performance Assessments in 20026. 
 
1.2. They are: 
 That any intervention had to be based on robust evidence of a failure to 
provide (or serious risk of failing to provide) for continuous improvement, 
evaluated by reference to the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with 
which an authority was conducting its activities. 
 That formal intervention could potentially include all and any aspects of an 
authority’s activities, (services, financial, corporate or collaborative 
performance), and  
 That formal intervention (at that time available under Section 15 of the 
Local Government Act 1999) would predominantly be used as a ‘last 
resort’. 
 
1.3. We strongly support these principles, and although they appear to be included, 
implied and/or assumed in the current document, in something as important as an 
intervention protocol, that may, if used, come under intense legal and political 
challenge, it is important to be as clear and as unambiguous as possible. We suggest 
these be clarified, articulated and set out within the introduction to the protocol, for 
example immediately after the legislative context and the basis of the protocol is 
described. 
  
1.4. The initial lessons and experience from the first 18 months of Local Government 
Intervention were available to the government when section 22 and 23 of the 2004 
Fire and Rescue Services Act were drawn up. Although the government had 
previously had ‘intervention’ powers in some aspects of Education, Social Services, 
Benefits Administration and more substantially in cases of financial irregularity, it 
quickly became apparent that the new powers under Section 15 of the Local 
Government Act, were far more wide-ranging and all-embracing than any of their 
14 
 
predecessors, and were therefore ‘prayed in aid’ of numerous service or corporate 
interventions during this early period7.  
 
1.5. In fact, in the vast majority of engagement or intervention cases, the formal use of 
powers did not have to be resorted to. However, the threat of their potential use, 
and the failure or withdrawal of all legal challenges to either their actual use or their 
proposed use, was a key aspect of the success of the Intervention and engagement 
programmes from 2001 (when three intervention pilots were undertaken, in Walsall 
Rossendale and Hull) through to 2009, when the final case in Northampton was 
successfully closed8.  
 
1.6. Section 15 powers are, of course, still available (albeit now to a different Secretary of 
State), but notwithstanding that the government intend the current protocol to be 
used solely in terms of Section 22 and 23 of the 2004 Act (as made clear in paragraph 
5), in our view the existence and the true extent of the Section 15 powers, and their 
availability to government should be made clear in any protocol.    
 
1.7. While the first sentence of paragraph 3 is correct when it states, “To date there has 
been no formal intervention in the operations of a fire and rescue authority by the 
Secretary of State under these powers”, this refers specifically to powers under the 
2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act, and currently gives a misleading impression to the 
public. 
 
1.8. It is only because of the existence of these powers (and the existence and use of 
Section 15 powers elsewhere within local government), that 
intervention/engagement/improvement action was undertaken in 7 FRAs falling in 
the poor/weak category of CPA in 20059.  
 
1.9. Cornwall was subjected to an improvement programme in 2008-2009, after it 
declined from fair to poor on CPA and a ‘direction of travel follow-up assessment’ by 
the Audit Commission highlighted inadequacies; which led to an external corporate 
inspection10. More recently external interventions in Essex FRS11 and Avon FRA12 
have only resulted because of the existence of such powers. 
 
1.10. The Fire and Rescue authorities and services require robust internal and external 
scrutiny arrangements to ensure they remain economic, efficient and effective 
deliverers of their services and provide appropriate assurance to the public. 
Experiences over the last 20 years have shown that the possibility of government 
intervention, even if only as a last resort, is a necessary part of that assurance and 
we support both the principle and the need for such a process to be formalised and 
structured and guided by a protocol. 
 
15 
 
1.11. In our view, the situations in Essex and Avon and the inadequacies highlighted by the 
NAO1 the Public Accounts Committee2 were partially a result of inadequate internal 
and external scrutiny and enforcement regime of the time. Part of this was the 
inadequacies in design and implementation of the ‘Sector-Led’ regime of 
performance management and intervention in Local Government and Fire and 
Rescue that has operated since 201013. 
 
1.12. The NAO and PAC investigations found significant inadequacies in the DCLG oversight 
of the Fire and Rescue Sector and significant inadequacies in the data and 
information available to DCLG in which to provide government and the public with 
the levels of assurance they could expect. Fire and Rescue Services, (individually or 
collectively) in effect did not have all the necessary performance management and 
scrutiny, tools and techniques, intelligence and data, to manage the sector-led 
system promoted by DCLG from 2010 to the end of 2015, when the NAO report was 
published.      
 
  
2. Role of partners in supporting fire and rescue authorities at risk 
 
2.1. A key part of the inadequacy of the Sector-Led performance management and 
intervention regimes was the ‘evidence base’ available to decision takers locally and 
nationally, a fact acknowledged by the Prime Minister when announcing the 
governments intended amendments to the (then) Crime and Policing Bill in March 
201714. 
 
2.2. The previous regimes from 2002-2010, were co-ordinated by the former Audit 
Commission and backed by extensive national and local performance reporting and 
data, data analysis, information and intelligence at national, regional and local levels.  
It had a demonstrable commitment to improving the evidence base available to the 
sector, to the Audit Commission and all key stakeholders, including the public. 
 
2.3. As we state above, in our view any intervention has to be based on robust evidence 
of a failure to provide (or serious risk of failing to provide) for continuous 
improvement, evaluated by reference to the economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
with which an authority was conducting its activities.  
 
2.4. We are concerned that paragraph 6 of the proposed protocol, appears to perpetuate 
or replicate an approach to identifying any FRA that is failing or likely to fail, to the 
one that has operated since 2010. The only differences being the replacement of the 
Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor by HMICFRS; the Chief Fire Officers Association by the 
NFCC and DCLG by the Home Office.  
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2.5. We therefore have concerns, about the adequacy of evidence available both to 
trigger an intervention (whether or not there has been a corporate inspection by 
HMICFRS), or to justify an intervention, and/or upon which to base an effective and 
appropriate recovery programme.   
 
2.6. We note that neither the HMICFRS consultation document, nor the proposed 
National Framework, have an explicit commitment to building evidence, capacity and 
capability and that they both assume and accept a shrinking resource envelope.   
 
2.7. Paragraph 6 states that HMICFRS will play a ‘leading role’ in identifying potential 
interventions. We note however, that the HMICFRS consultation states that they are 
not being resourced to carry out thematic inspections and that they are not 
proposing to undertake regular and routine corporate inspections.  
 
2.8. We question therefore whether the current proposals are ‘fit for their intended 
purpose’, particularly in a situation where political and legal challenges may be 
forthcoming. 
 
2.9. In terms of the proposed reaction to potential intervention in an authority 
(paragraph 7), we strongly support the contents and principles articulated in this 
paragraph. 
 
 Circumstances leading to statutory intervention 
2.10. We strongly support the content and the assurance provided by paragraph 8, and 
hope these will be retained in any final protocol issued with the new National 
Framework. 
 
2.11. Paragraph 9 refers to the merits and scheduling of sector-led initiatives, as opposed 
or in parallel to, alternative external interventions which are discussed at length in 
the paper ‘Building the next model for intervention and turnaround in poorly 
performing local authorities in England7’ referred to in paragraph 1.5 of this 
response. 
 
2.12. Paragraph 9 refers to the Secretary of State being able to appoint HMICFRS to carry 
out an investigation under Section 28 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act. This 
provision is not limited to HMICFRS inspectors but to “inspectors” (you may, for 
example, need to appoint a financial investigator) – we suggest the insertion of the 
words “or other inspectors”.   
 
3. What happens upon statutory intervention? 
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3.1. It might be useful in paragraph 11 to mention the relevant Police Authority, the Local 
Authority and the relevant Ambulance Trust, amongst the bodies that the Secretary 
of State may consult. 
 
3.2. We agree and support the suggestion that any formal intervention will be 
determined on a case by case basis. However, paragraph 12 suggests the Secretary 
of State will subsequently ‘agree a course of action, and how the improvement will 
be delivered’. This is far too unfettered in the power it abrogates to the Secretary of 
State.  
 
3.3. There should be public reporting and timetable requirements drawn up in practice 
guidelines for the conduct of these interventions as there has been for all cases in 
the past.  These requirements should include arrangements for keeping the NFCC, 
the LGA and HMICFRS informed.   
 
4. Concluding comments 
 
4.1. We strongly support the need for a clear, ambiguous protocol on which to base 
decisions (and to scrutinise) formal statutory interventions. 
 
4.2. As can be seen from our responses above, we believe the current proposals can, and 
should be improved and clarified for the benefit of all key stakeholders including the 
public and we have sought to make a contribution towards that goal. 
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